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Section 622 of the Dodd-Frank Act: Self-Defeating
Liability Concentration Limits
I. INTRODUCTION
The recent financial crisis has demonstrated that, under “unusual
and exigent circumstance,” the Federal Reserve Board (“Fed”) is willing
to allow mergers that are unlikely to be approved during normal times.1
At the height of the crisis, the Fed was not only playing the role of an
impartial regulator but also that of a matchmaker by actively arranging
mergers among the troubled financial institutions.2 As a consequence,
the banks that were too-big-to-fail (“TBTF”) got even bigger after the
crisis:3 the assets of the five largest banks as a share of GDP increased
from 43% in 2006 to 56% in 2011.4
A TBTF firm is “one whose size, complexity, interconnectedness,
and critical functions are such that, should the firm go unexpectedly into
liquidation, the rest of the financial system and the economy would face

1. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Statement Regarding the
Application and Notices by Wells Fargo & Company to Acquire Wachovia Corporation and
Wachovia’s Subsidiary Banks and Nonbanking Companies 2 (Oct. 21, 2008),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/orders/orders20081021a1.pdf.
2. See ANDREW ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW WALL
STREET AND WASHINGTON FOUGHT TO SAVE THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM—AND THEMSELVES 456
(2009) (describing how Timothy Geithner, then the president of the FRB New York, tried to
arrange bank mergers with Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley who were in danger of
failing).
3. In contrast to their U.S. counterparts, the European banks that received government
aid did not increase their market share. Gert-Jan Koopman, Stability and Competition in EU
Banking during the Financial Crisis: The Role of State Aid and Control, 7 COMPETITION
POL’Y INT’L 17 (2011). It has been argued that what made the difference was the active
involvement of the EU competition authority, who took actions against policies that would
favor local companies of the member states. Albert A. Foer & Don Allen Resnikoff,
Competition Policy and “Too Big” Banks in the European Union and the United States, 59
ANTITRUST BULL. 11–19 (2014). This suggests that competition policy could play a larger
role in addressing the TBTF problem. A formal analysis of this topic is beyond the scope of
this Note. For a discussion, see Xavier Vives, Competition and Stability in Banking (IESE
Bus.
Sch.,
Working
Paper
No.
852,
2010),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1593613.
4. David J. Lynch, Big Banks: Now Even Too Bigger To Fail, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK, Apr. 23–29, 2012, at 33, 33.
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severe, adverse consequences.”5 However, providing assistance to and
preventing the collapse of a TBTF firm during a financial crisis creates
several long term problems for the economy.6 First, it generates a moral
hazard problem where TBTF firms “take more risk than desirable”
expecting to receive assistance “if their bets go bad.”7 Second, it creates
an uneven playing field between large and small firms. 8 Third, TBTF
firms can themselves become risks to financial stability. 9
Conceptually, there are three different ways to resolve the TBTF
problem: (1) prevent banks from becoming too big; (2) prevent big banks
from failing; and (3) allow big banks to fail in an orderly fashion. 10 The
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010
(“Dodd-Frank”) adopted all three of the above approaches.11 Section
622, as part of the first line of defense in Dodd-Frank against the TBTF
problem, requires that the liabilities of a financial company after a merger
should not exceed 10% of the liabilities of all financial companies in the
United States.12
Like many other Dodd-Frank provisions, section 622 has been
criticized on several different grounds.13 It has been argued that the
concentration limit puts U.S. financial companies at a competitive
disadvantage against foreign financial institutions. 14 Others have
5. Causes of the Recent Financial and Economic Crisis: Testimony Before the Fin.
Crisis Inquiry Comm’n 20 (Sept. 2, 2010) (statement of Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of
the
Governors
of
the
Fed.
Reserve
Sys.),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/bernanke20100902a.htm.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 20–21.
8. Id. at 21.
9. Id.
10. There is wide-ranging disagreement on whether all (or any) of the three approaches
need to be taken. See H. Rodgin Cohen, Preventing the Fire Next Time: Too Big To Fail, 90
TEX. L. REV. 1717, 1737–38 (2011–2012) (arguing that empirical evidence does not support
the premise that larger banks are more risky); Adam J. Levitin, In Defense of Bailouts, 99
GEO. L.J. 435, 489 (2010–2011) (questioning whether Orderly Liquidation process under
Dodd-Frank will be better able to contain the systemic risk than Chapter 11 process).
11. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) §
622, 12 U.S.C. § 1852 (2012). For a general discussion of Dodd-Frank and TBTF problem,
see Lissa Lamkin Broome, The Dodd-Frank Act: TARP Bailout Backlash and Too Big To
Fail, 15 N.C. BANKING INST. 69 (2011).
12. Dodd-Frank § 622, 12 U.S.C. § 1852.
13. See generally VIRAL V. ACHARYA ET AL., REGULATING WALL STREET: THE DODDFRANK ACT AND THE NEW ARCHITECTURE OF GLOBAL FINANCE (2011); DAVID A. SKEEL, THE
NEW FINANCIAL DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND ITS (UNINTENDED)
CONSEQUENCES (2011).
14. See, e.g., Financial Regulatory Reform: The International Context: Hearing Before
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questioned whether it is desirable to maintain a hard-and-fast rule like the
10% limit on liability concentration.15 This Note argues that the strongest
criticism, however, comes from the observation that section 622 is not
entirely consistent with other Dodd-Frank provisions. Furthermore, this
Note points out that there are other clauses in Dodd-Frank that can be
used to block the types of mergers that threaten the stability of the
financial system. What distinguishes section 622 is that it is a bright-line
rule that limits the Fed’s discretionary power. This Note shows, however,
that this provision allows exceptions that give discretion back to the Fed,
and hence, defeat the purpose of the legislation.
Although unsuccessful, several attempts have been made to
correct the deficiencies inherent in section 622. Before the passage of the
final bill, Senators Sherrod Brown and Ted Kaufman proposed an
amendment (“Brown-Kaufman Amendment”) containing a provision that
addressed this problem by eliminating the Fed’s discretion.16 The
Brown-Kaufman Amendment ultimately failed to be adopted.17 In 2012,
the amendment was modified and reintroduced as the SAFE Banking
Act.18 Although this bill also was not enacted, it contained a section
similar to section 622, but without the crippling exceptions.
This Note proceeds as follows. Part II provides the background
with a brief legislative history behind section 622 and its relation to the
existing 10% deposit cap.19 Part III examines the main elements of
section 622 and its relation to other Dodd-Frank provisions.20 Part IV
examines two minor issues regarding section 622: economies of scale and
the rigid 10% cap.21 Part V discusses the problematic exceptions allowed
and the two failed attempts to amend section 622—the Brown-Kaufman
Amendment and the SAFE Banking Act.22 A summary and a conclusion
follow in Part VI.23

the H. Comm. on Fin. Serv., 112th Cong. 161 (2011) [hereinafter Scott] (statement of Hal S.
Scott, Professor, Harvard Law School).
15. See ACHARYA ET AL., supra note 13, at 197.
16. S. Amend. 3733, 111th Cong. (2010).
17. 156 CONG. REC. S3352 (daily ed. May 6, 2010).
18. Safe Accountable Fair, and Efficient Banking Act, H.R. 5714, 112th Cong. (2012).
19. See infra Part II.
20. See infra Part III.
21. See infra Part IV.
22. See infra Part V.
23. See infra Part VI.
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II. BACKGROUND
A proper understanding of section 622—or any statute, for that
matter—requires context. For this purpose, a brief legislative history is
provided for necessary background. Following is a discussion of the
relation of Section 622 to the existing nationwide deposit cap.
A.

Legislative History

Dodd-Frank was the U.S. government’s response to the financial
crisis of 2008. It was first proposed by the Obama Administration
(“Administration”) in June 2009.24 A version of the bill passed the House
on December 11, 2009,25 and passed the Senate, with amendment, on
May 20, 2010.26 A conference committee was convened to resolve the
differences, and the final bill passed both houses by July 15, 2010. 27 The
bill was signed into law by President Obama on July 21, 2010.28
Section 622 was neither in the House bill nor in the
Administration’s original proposal—instead, it was added later by the
Administration, along with the Volcker Rule, after the bill was passed by
the House.29 It is not exactly clear how section 622 made its way into the
bill. One story attributes its genesis to President Obama’s outrage at the
news that Wall Street executives were getting larger year-end bonuses in
2009 than they had in 2007.30 The White House formally announced the
new proposal on January 21, 2010.31

24. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, U.S. Treasury Dep’t Releases Fin.
Regulatory Reform (June 17, 2009), http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/pressreleases/Pages/20096171052487309.aspx (proposing a “new foundation for financial
regulation and supervision”).
25. 155 CONG. REC. H14804 (daily ed. Dec. 11, 2009).
26. 156 CONG. REC. S4078 (daily ed. May 20, 2010).
27. 156 CONG. REC. S5933 (daily ed. July 15, 2010).
28. Remarks on Signing the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act, 2010 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 3 (July 21, 2010).
29. 156 CONG. REC. S2377 (daily ed. Apr. 15, 2010).
30. Michael Hirsh, Paul Volcker: First He Challenged Obama, Then He Changed Wall
Street,
THE
ATLANTIC
(Dec.
11,
2013),
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2013/12/paul-volcker-first-he-challengedobama-then-he-changed-wall-street/282259/.
31. Press Release, The White House, President Obama Calls for New Restrictions on
Size and Scope of Financial Institutions to Rein in Excesses and Protect Taxpayers (Jan. 21,
2010), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/president-obama-calls-new-restrictionssize-and-scope-financial-institutions-rein-e.
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Section 622 did not get significant attention from Congress before
it was enacted. Its insignificant impression is especially apparent when
compared with the Volcker Rule. For example, while the Senate
conference report does not mention section 622 at all, it mentions section
619’s Volcker Rule seventy-one times.32 One reason for this might be
that the proposed legislation looked similar to the existing nationwide
10% deposit limit.33 In fact, this is how the Administration marketed
section 622 at the Senate hearing—as a provision designed to
“supplement” the existing deposit cap.34 There were, however,
significant differences between the two.
B.

Relation to the Riegle-Neal Act

The Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency
Act (“Riegle-Neal Act”) was signed into law by President Clinton on
September 29, 1994.35 As the title suggests, the legislation was
introduced to eliminate then existing restrictions on interstate
branching.36 To address the concern about excessive concentration of the
banking industry, the Riegle-Neal Act prohibited banks from controlling
more than 30% of statewide deposits or 10% of nationwide deposits after
a merger.37
Despite the apparent similarity, there are two important
differences between section 622 and the deposit cap under the RiegleNeal Act. First, section 622 is not limited to regulating deposits—it
regulates total liabilities.38 This has important consequences in

32. See 156 CONG. REC. S5870–933 (daily ed. July 15, 2010). In the House report,
section 622 is not mentioned and section 619 or the Volcker Rule is mentioned eight times.
See Cong. Rec. H5233–61 (daily ed. June 30, 2010).
33. Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 (“Riegle-Neal
Act”) § 101(a), 12 U.S.C. §1842(d) (2012).
34. Prohibiting Certain High-Risk Investment Activities by Banks and Bank Holding
Companies: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 111th Cong.
4–5 (2010) (statement of Neal S. Wolin, Deputy Secretary of the Treasury).
35. Remarks on Signing the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency
Act of 1994, 30 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1896 (Sept. 29, 1994).
36. For the history of interstate banking and the significance of Riegle-Neal Act, see
LISSA L. BROOME & JERRY W. MARKHAM, REGULATION OF BANK FINANCIAL SERVICE
ACTIVITIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 633–62 (4th ed. 2011).
37. Riegle-Neal Act § 101(a), 12 U.S.C. §1842(d).
38. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) §
622, 12 U.S.C. § 1852 (2012).
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controlling the systemic risk that results from bank failures. Given the
deposit insurance offered by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(“FDIC”), having a large amount of deposits does not necessarily make a
bank vulnerable to a bank run.39 Focusing on liabilities rather than just
deposits was, therefore, a significant change.
Second, section 622 covers more institutions than the Riegle-Neal
Act. The 10% deposit cap only applies to a “bank” under the Bank
Holding Company Act (“BHC Act”).40 This definition of a bank excludes
several bank-like institutions such as savings and loan associations,
savings banks, and industrial loan companies.41 During the financial
crisis, Bank of America acquired Merrill Lynch.42 Although their
combined deposit share would reach 11.9%, the 10% cap did not apply
because the acquired companies were a savings bank and an industrial
loan company.43 Section 622 closed this “loophole” by expanding the
institutions covered.44
C.

Implementation of Section 622

Section 622 provided that the Financial Stability Oversight
Council (“FSOC”) conduct a study45 and that the Fed issue regulations in
accordance with FSOC’s recommendations.46 The section specifically
required that the FSOC study examine the effects of the concentration
39. A bank with a large amount of uninsured deposits—those exceeding the current limit
$250,000—could, however, be subject to a bank run. See, e.g., Douglas W. Diamond & Philip
H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity, 91 J. POL. ECON. 401, 412 (1983)
(showing that, without deposit insurance, a bank run may arise from self-fulfilling panics
among rational depositors).
40. Bank Holding Company Act (“BHC Act”) § 2(c) (1956) (current version at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1841(c) (2012)).
41. Id.
42. Press Release, Fed. Reserve Bd., Approval of Proposal by Bank of America to
Acquire
Merrill
Lynch
1
(November
26,
2008),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/orders/20081126a.htm.
43. Id. at 2, n.6.
44. See infra Section III.A.1.
45. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) §
622, 12 U.S.C. § 1852(e) (2012) (Although § 622 is codified in its entirety at 12 U.S.C. §
1852, § 622 does not have the matching subsections of § 1852. This is because § 622 is
structured so that it adds a new section to the existing BHA Act. This Note adopts the
convention that, whenever it cites a subsection of § 1852, it parallel cites Dodd-Frank § 622
in order to show its origin, even though, strictly speaking, there is no matching subsection in
§ 622).
46. Dodd-Frank § 622, 12 U.S.C. § 1852 (d).
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limits in four particular areas: (1) financial stability; (2) moral hazard in
the financial system; (3) efficiency and competitiveness of U.S. financial
firms and financial markets; and (4) cost and availability of credit and
other financial services.47
The FSOC study concluded that the concentration limit will
reduce the risk to the U.S. financial system and, in the long run, enhance
the competitiveness of U.S. financial firms.48 The impact on moral
hazard and the availability of credit were expected to be neutral.49 FSOC
made three recommendations: (1) measure liabilities of financial
companies not subject to consolidated risk-based capital rules using the
U.S. generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) or other
applicable accounting standards; (2) use a two-year average to calculate
aggregate financial sector liabilities and publish annually by July 1 the
current aggregate financial sector liabilities applicable to the period of
July 1 through June 30 of the following year; and (3) extend the “failing
bank exception” to apply to the acquisition of any type of insured
depository institution currently in default or in danger of default. 50 On
May 15, 2014, the Fed announced a proposed rule that reflected FSOC’s
recommendations.51
III. LIABILITY CONCENTRATION LIMITS ON LARGE FINANCIAL
COMPANIES
Effective January 1, 2015, the Fed approved a final rule that
implemented section 622 of Dodd-Frank.52 The rule prohibits “covered
acquisitions” that result in a financial company having consolidated
liabilities greater than 10% of the aggregate consolidated liabilities of all
financial companies in the United States.53 A covered acquisition is a

47. Dodd-Frank § 622, 12 U.S.C. § 1852(e)(1)(A).
48. FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, STUDY & RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING

CONCENTRATION LIMITS ON LARGE FINANCIAL COMPANIES 4 (2011) [hereinafter COUNCIL
STUDY],
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/Study%20on%20Concentration%20Limits%
20on%20Large%20Firms%2001-17-11.pdf.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 16–22.
51. Concentration Limits on Large Financial Companies, 79 Fed. Reg. 27801 (proposed
May 15, 2014) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 251).
52. Concentration Limit (Regulation XX), 12 C.F.R. pt. 251 (2015).
53. 12 C.F.R. §§ 251.2(f), 253(a).
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transaction in which a company: (1) merges or consolidates with; (2)
acquires all or substantially all of the assets of; or (3) otherwise acquires
control of another company.54 This does not prevent, for example,
increasing liabilities in excess of the cap through internal, organic
growth.55 The elements of section 622 and its relation to other DoddFrank provisions are discussed in some detail below.
A.

Elements of Section 622

Section 622 prohibits a “financial company” from holding
“liabilities” greater than 10% of the liabilities of all financial companies
in the United States subject to certain exceptions. The meaning of
financial company and liabilities as well as the three exceptions allowed
are examined in turn.
1. Financial Company
A “financial company” is (1) an insured depository institution;
(2) a bank holding company (“BHC”); (3) a savings and loan holding
company; (4) a company that controls an insured depository institution;
(5) a nonbank financial company supervised by the Fed;56 or (6) a foreign
bank or company that is treated as a BHC for the purposes of the BHC
Act.57 Thus, this definition includes commercial or industrial firms that
control an insured depository institution (e.g., an industrial loan company
or limited-purpose credit card bank).58 On the other hand, the definition
excludes credit unions as well as insurance or securities companies that
are not affiliated with an insured depository institution unless the
company is a nonbank financial company supervised by the Fed.59
54. Id.
55. COUNCIL STUDY, supra note 48, at 9. Also, acquisitions in the ordinary course of

collecting a debt or in a fiduciary capacity in good faith are not covered. 12 C.F.R. §§
251.2(f)(1), (f)(2).
56. Section 113 of Dodd-Frank provides that the FSOC may require that a nonbank
financial company be subject to the supervision by the Fed if the FSOC demines that the
company could pose a threat to the financial stability of the United States. Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) § 113, 12 U.S.C. § 5323 (2012).
57. Dodd-Frank § 622, 12 U.S.C. § 1852. A foreign company is treated as a bank holding
company if it, or one of its subsidiaries, is a foreign bank or has a commercial lending
subsidiary in the U.S. 12 U.S.C. § 3106 (2012).
58. COUNCIL STUDY, supra note 48, at 5–6.
59. Id. at 6.
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2. Liabilities
“Liabilities” are computed by subtracting total regulatory
capital from total risk-weighted assets.61 For foreign financial
companies, liabilities include only those of their U.S. operations.62 The
aggregate liabilities of all financial companies are calculated as the
average of the year-end liabilities for the preceding two calendar years.63
This measure is then used from July 1 of each year until June 30 of the
following year.64 For the first period between July 1, 2015, and June 30,
2016, the aggregate liabilities are equal to the year-end liabilities figure
as of December 31, 2014.65
Section 622 requires that the risk-weighted assets be adjusted to
reflect exposures that are deducted from regulatory capital.66 The Fed set
the adjustment formula in its final rule.67 For a U.S. company subject to
applicable risk-based capital rules, the liabilities are equal to: (1) total
risk-weighted assets; plus (2) the amount of assets deducted from the
regulatory capital, times a “multiplier;” minus (3) total regulatory capital
of the company.68 The “multiplier” is the inverse of the company’s total
risk-based capital ratio minus one.69
This seemingly complicated adjustment is necessary because, by
construction, certain intangible assets like goodwill are deducted—from
both capital and assets—before risk-based capital ratios are calculated.70
60

60. Total regulatory capital is defined as the sum of (1) common equity tier 1 capital; (2)
additional tier 1 capital; and (3) tier 2 capital. 12 C.F.R. § 217.2.
61. For a large BHC with total consolidated assets greater than or equal to $250 billion,
total risk-weighted assets are defined as: (1) the sum of (i) credit-risk-weighted assets; (ii)
credit valuation adjustment risk-weighted assets; (iii) risk-weighted assets for operational
risk; and (iv) advanced market risk-weighted assets, if applicable; minus (2) excess eligible
credit reserves not included in the BHC’s tier 2 capital. 12 C.F.R. §§ 217.2, 217.100(b).
62. 12 C.F.R. § 251.3(d).
63. 12 C.F.R. § 251.3(a)(2).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) §
622, 12 U.S.C. § 1852(a)(3)(A)(i), (B)(i) (2012).
67. 12 C.F.R. § 251.3(c).
68. Id. When a company is not subject to risk-based capital rules, liabilities are
calculated using U.S. generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) or other accounting
standard approved by the Fed. 12 C.F.R. §§ 251.2(a), 251.3(e).
69. 12 C.F.R. § 251.3(c).
70. Concentration Limits on Large Financial Companies, 79 Fed. Reg. 27801, 27803
(proposed May 15, 2014) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 251).
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The effect of this deduction is to require companies to hold a dollar of
capital against each dollar of such assets. 71 The adjustment is thus
designed to add these deducted assets back—after converting them into
their risk-weighted-asset equivalents by properly inflating them.72
On July 1, 2015, the Fed announced that, as of December 31,
2014, the aggregate financial sector liabilities were $21.6 trillion.73 The
10% concentration limit for the year beginning July 1, 2014, is therefore
set at $2.16 trillion. This amount does not seem particularly restrictive
because it would only affect the largest financial companies in the
country. For example, it would prohibit a merger between any pair of the
four largest BHCs: JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, Citigroup, and
Wells Fargo.74 It would also block a merger between Bank of America
and MetLife or any combination of JPMorgan Chase with MetLife,
Prudential Financial, GE Capital, or Goldman Sachs.75
3. Exceptions
Three exceptions to the liability concentration limit are allowed:
acquisition of a depository institution (1) “in default or in danger of
71. Id.
72. Id. A simple numerical example will clarify this procedure. Suppose that the only

deducted asset is goodwill worth $2 billion. Assume also that the total risk weighted assets
are $100 billion and the regulatory capital is $8 billion. The company’s capital ratio is thus
8%. How much assets should be added for a proper adjustment? Adding $2 billion is surely
not enough because it would require only additional $160 million (= $2 billion x 0.08) of
capital. The right amount for the adjustment in this case is $2 billion x 1/0.08 = $25 billion.
To confirm, consider having additional risk weighed assets worth $25 billion. Given that the
capital ratio is 8%, the company would need additional capital worth $25 billion x 0.08 = $2
billion in order to keep the capital ratio constant. When the goodwill is added back to assets,
it has to be added back to capital as well. Therefore, the capital needs to be adjusted upward
as well by $2 billion. But this means that total liabilities—total risk-weighted assets minus
capital—now becomes $100 billion + $25 billion – ($8 billion + $2 billion) = $115 billion. It
is straightforward to verify that applying the formula delivers exactly the same result: $100
billion + $2 billion x (1/0.08 – 1) – $8 billion = $115 billion.
73. Press Release, Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Federal Reserve Board
Releases First Determination of the Aggregate Consolidated Liabilities of All Financial
Companies in Accordance with Section 622 of the Dodd-Frank Act (July 1, 2015),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20150701a.htm.
74. COUNCIL STUDY, supra note 48, at 8.
75. As of December 31, 2014, the ten largest financial companies in terms of their
liabilities were: JPMorgan Chase ($1.71 trillion), Bank of America ($1.40 trillion), Citigroup
($1.28 trillion), Wells Fargo ($1.21 trillion), MetLife ($0.83 trillion), Prudential Financial
($0.72 trillion), GE Capital ($0.51 trillion), Goldman Sachs ($0.50 trillion), Morgan Stanley
($0.42 trillion), and AIG ($0.41 trillion). The liability figures were computed by the author
from each company’s Form 10-K for year 2014.
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default; (2) with respect to which assistance is provided by the
[FDIC] . . . ; or (3) that would result in a de minimis increase in the
liabilities of the merged [financial] company.”76
First, the acquisition of an insured depository institution that is in
default or in danger of default may be allowed despite the concentration
limit (“failing bank exception”).77 Whether an institution is in default or
in danger of default is determined by its appropriate federal banking
regulator in consultation with the Fed.78 Second, an exception may be
made for an acquisition for which the FDIC provides assistance (“FDIC
assisted acquisition”).79 The law allows the FDIC to provide such
assistance to prevent a default, to restore a bank in default to normal
operation, or to mitigate the risk to the FDIC under severe financial
conditions that threaten the stability of depository institutions.80 Third,
de minimis increases in liabilities are allowed.81 An increase in liabilities
is de minimis if it does not exceed $2 billion.82
These exceptions are likely motivated by cost-effectiveness
concerns. The benefit from regulating de minimis acquisitions, for
example, will mostly be outweighed by the cost to the merging banks as
well as to the regulator. Similarly, the first two exceptions could be
justified by the fact that, in many cases, it is more costly to liquidate a
bank than to have it acquired by a healthy bank.
But this ex post efficiency—the notion that a merger could be
cheaper than liquidation after a bank fails—does not guarantee overall
efficiency. Knowing that a troubled bank can be acquired by another
bank, banks will have less incentive to run their businesses prudently. In
other words, allowing mergers for failing banks will create ex ante
inefficiency that could outweigh any ex post efficiency gains. In fact, this
is what is at the heart of the TBTF problem—although bailouts may be
the most cost-efficient way of resolving failing banks, they also make
banks more likely to fail in the first place. The implications of these

76. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) §
622, 12 U.S.C. § 1852(c) (2012).
77. Dodd-Frank § 622, 12 U.S.C. § 1852(c)(1).
78. 12 C.F.R. § 251.4(a)(1) (2015).
79. Dodd-Frank § 622, 12 U.S.C. § 1852(c)(2).
80. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(1).
81. Dodd-Frank § 622, 12 U.S.C. § 1852(c)(3).
82. 12 C.F.R. § 251.4(a)(3).
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exceptions are discussed in detail in Part V.83
B.

Relation to Sections 604, 163, and 121.

There are other Dodd-Frank provisions that regulate mergers that
threaten the stability of the financial system. Section 604 addresses
mergers by a depository institution or those involving a BHC, 84 while
section 163 deals with merger involving systemically significant nonbank
financial companies.85 With a supermajority vote of FSOC, section 121
gives the Fed comprehensive authority to regulate the activities—
including mergers and acquisitions—of systemically important financial
institutions (“SIFIs”).86
The Bank Merger Act provides that an insured depository
institution must get the approval of its federal agency87 in order to merge
with, or acquire the assets of any other insured depository institution.88
The BHC Act, on the other hand, requires that a merger or acquisition
that involves a BHC must be approved by the Fed.89 Section 604 of

83.
84.
85.
86.

See infra Part V.
Dodd-Frank § 604(d), (e)(1), (f), 12 U.S.C. §§ 1842(c), 1843(j)(2)(A), 1828(c)(5).
Dodd-Frank § 163, 12 U.S.C. § 5363.
Dodd-Frank § 121, 12 U.S.C. § 5331. Dodd-Frank §§ 165 and 166 imposed
enhanced supervision and prudential standards for BHCs with total consolidated assets greater
than or equal to $50 billion and the nonbank financial companies designated by the FSOC—
collectively called Systemically Important Financial Institutions. Dodd-Frank §§ 165, 166,
12 U.S.C. §§ 5365, 5366.
87. This is the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency for a national bank or a federal
savings association, the Fed for a state member bank, and the FDIC for a state nonmember
insured bank or a state savings association. Bank Merger Act, Pub. L. No. 89-356, 64 Stat.
892 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(2) (2012) (amending Federal Deposit
Insurance Act §18(c)(2)).
88. Id. More precisely, this requires the approval by the agency that will regulate the
resulting entity. Id.
89. Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. 1842(a) (2012). More specifically, the Fed’s
approval is required:
(1) for any action to be taken that causes any company to become a bank
holding company; (2) for any action to be taken that causes a bank to
become a subsidiary of a bank holding company; (3) any bank holding
company to acquire direct or indirect ownership or control of any voting
shares of any bank if, after such acquisition, such company will directly
or indirectly own or control more than 5 per centum of the voting shares
of such bank; (4) for any bank holding company or subsidiary thereof,
other than a bank, to acquire all or substantially all of the assets of a bank;
or (5) for any bank holding company to merge or consolidate with any
other bank holding company.
Id.
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Dodd-Frank provides that the responsible agency—and the Fed, in case
of a merger involving a BHC—should consider the “risk to the stability
of the United States banking or financial system” in determining whether
to approve or deny a proposed merger.90
Section 163 of Dodd Frank provides that a systemically
significant nonbank financial company is treated as a BHC for the
purpose of mergers and acquisitions approval.91 The same section also
requires that SIFIs receive the Fed’s approval prior to acquiring
ownership or control of any voting shares of a company that: (1) is
engaged in activities that are financial in nature;92 and (2) has assets of
$10 billion or more.93
Section 121 of Dodd Frank provides that, when a SIFI is deemed
to pose a “grave threat”94 to the stability of the U.S. financial system, the
Fed may take “mitigatory” actions with a vote of two-thirds or more of
FSOC.95 This is a comprehensive authority that allows (1) limiting
mergers and acquisitions involving the SIFI; (2) restricting product
offerings; (3) requiring termination of certain activities; (4) imposing
conditions on activities; and (5) ordering divestiture of assets or offbalance-sheet items if necessary.96
In terms of regulating mergers and acquisitions, sections 604,
163, and 121 cover most of the transactions that fall under section 622.97
There is, however, a fundamental difference: section 622 prohibits such
mergers and acquisitions as a rule while sections 604, 163, and 121

90. Dodd-Frank § 604(d), (e)(1), (f), 12 U.S.C. §§ 1842(c), 1843(j)(2)(A), 1828(c)(5).
91. Dodd-Frank § 163(a), 12 U.S.C. § 5363(a).
92. Those are activities that are: (1) financial in nature; (2) incidental to such financial

activity; and (3) complementary to a financial activity. Financial Services Modernization Act
of 1999 (Graham-Leach-Bliley Act), 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k) (2012).
93. Dodd-Frank § 163(b), 12 U.S.C. § 5363(b).
94. For the purpose of determining whether a company poses a “grave threat,” the Fed
and the FSOC must consider the same factors used to designate a SIFI. Dodd-Frank § 121(c),
12 U.S.C. § 5331(c). The factors include, among other things, the leverage, off-balance-sheet
exposures, nature, scope, size, scale, concentration, interconnectedness, and mix of the
activities of the company. Dodd-Frank § 113(a)–(b), 12 U.S.C. § 5323(a)–(b).
95. Dodd-Frank § 121(a), 12 U.S.C. § 5331(a).
96. Id.
97. An exception will be a bank acquiring the assets of a non-depository institution
through asset purchase. Section 604 does not apply here because the target is not a depository
institution. Dodd-Frank § 604(f), 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c). Section 163 does not apply either
because the bank does not “acquire ownership or control of any voting shares of” another
company. Dodd-Frank § 163(b), 12 U.S.C. § 5363(b). Arguably, § 121 may still apply if the
bank belongs to a SIFI. Dodd-Frank § 121(a), 12 U.S.C. § 5331(a).
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provide the federal regulatory agencies with a discretionary power to
prohibit the merger. As later discussion shows, however, this difference
becomes moot once the exceptions to section 622 are taken into
account.98
IV. MINOR ISSUES
Section 622 raised several important issues, most of which were
identified in the FSOC study.99 These are mostly “minor” issues in the
sense that they may have some potentially adverse effects, but not to the
extent that they undermine the purpose of the legislation. Two such
issues—economies of scale and the 10% threshold—are somewhat
controversial.
A.

Economies of Scale

It has been argued that section 622 will prevent U.S. financial
companies from realizing economies of scale through mergers.100 Given
that the concentration limit affects only the largest of such mergers, the
issue becomes whether economies of scale still exist for financial firms
of very large size.101 But empirical evidence is mixed on this subject.102
Although most research prior to 2000 found that economies of scale are
exhausted at a modest size, some recent research has found that
economies of scale exist for even the largest banks.103 Also worth noting
98.
99.
100.
101.

See infra Part V.
COUNCIL STUDY, supra note 48, at 8–13.
Scott, supra note 14, at 161.
See COUNCIL STUDY, supra note 48, at 11 (discussing the effects of the concentration
limit on efficiency and competiveness of U.S. financial firms).
102. Id. at n.22.
103. Id. at 11. For a summary of research prior to 2000, see GROUP OF TEN, REP. ON
CONSOLIDATION IN THE FIN. SECTOR 23 (2001), http://www.bis.org/publ/gten05.pdf
(“Evidence suggests that only relatively small banks could generally become more efficient
form an increase in size.”). For studies that found economies of scale, see generally Guohua
Feng & Apostolos Serletis, Efficiency, Technical Change, and Returns to Scale in Large US
Banks: Panel Data Evidence from an Output Distance Function Satisfying Theoretical
Regularity, 34 J. BANKING & FIN. 127 (2010); Joseph P. Hughes, et. al., Are Scale Economies
in Banking Elusive or Illusive? Evidence Obtained by Incorporating Capital Structure and
Risk-Taking into Models of Bank Production, 25 J. BANKING & FIN. 2169 (2001); David C.
Wheelock & Paul W. Wilson, Do Large Banks Have Lower Costs? New Estimates of Returns
to Scale for U.S. Banks, 44 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 171 (2012). A related question is
whether keeping the market competitive will increase innovation in the long run. The
empirical evidence on the link between market structure and innovation is mixed. Wesley M.

2016]

SECTION 622 OF THE DODD-FRANK ACT

353

is the fact that the estimated economies of scale may reflect the value of
the implicit government guarantee due to the TBTF concern.104
A related issue arises from the fact that section 622 treats
domestic and foreign institutions asymmetrically. 105 The concentration
limit is based on global consolidated liabilities for U.S. financial
companies, but only on the liabilities of the U.S. operations for foreign
financial companies.106 Consequently, a large U.S. financial company
may not acquire a U.S. financial company of substantial size, whereas a
large foreign financial company with a relatively small U.S. presence
may be able to acquire the same U.S. financial company because only its
U.S. liabilities after the acquisition will count for the purpose of section
622.107
This asymmetric treatment could potentially put U.S. financial
companies at a competitive disadvantage.108 But the rationale behind the
unequal treatment is not difficult to understand. If foreign companies
were measured based on their global liabilities instead of the liabilities of
their U.S. operations, it would create a potentially more serious
competitive concern. It could put, for example, a foreign company with
Cohen, Fifty Years of Empirical Studies of Innovative Activity and Performance, in 1
HANDBOOK OF THE ECON. OF INNOVATION 129, 154 (Bronwyn H. Hall & Nathan Rosenberg
eds., 2010).
104. See Loretta J. Mester, Scale Economies in Banking and Financial Regulatory
Reform,
THE
REGION
10,
12
(Sept.
2010)
https://www.minneapolisfed.org/~/media/files/pubs/region/10-09/scale2.pdf (noting that
“[t]oo-big-to-fail considerations may be a source of some gains” associated with scale
economies). A simple numerical example will illustrate this issue. Suppose that an empirical
study found that the average cost of large banks was lower than that of medium-size banks by
10%. The same study also found that the average cost of “very large” banks was lower than
that of medium-size banks by 15%. Does this mean that economies of scale exist for the very
large banks? Not necessarily. The problem is that some of the 15% cost advantage might be
attributable to the implicit government guarantee enjoyed by the very large banks (for
example, they may have been able to borrow at a lower rate because of the implicit
government guarantee). Suppose that 7% out of the 15% cost reduction was due to this
implicit guarantee. But this implies that, without the TBTF “premium,” the very large banks
would have had only 8% cost advantage over medium-sized banks. This means that, net of
the TBTF effect, there were some diseconomies of scale between the large and the very large
banks. If the TBTF premium had been only 3% instead, the true cost reduction would have
been 12%, and there would have been economies of scale between the large and the very large
banks. The issue will be resolved if there is a reliable estimate of the TBTF premium. But
such an estimate will be difficult—if not impossible—to obtain in practice.
105. COUNCIL STUDY, supra note 48, at 12.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See id. (noting that the concentration limit could increase the number of large
foreign-based firms over U.S.-based firms).
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a limited U.S. branch network at a competitive disadvantage against their
much larger U.S. competitors. FSOC recommended that the Fed monitor
the “competitive dynamics” between U.S. and foreign firms and make
recommendations to Congress if necessary. 109 Given the subtlety of the
issue, FSOC’s solution seems reasonable for now.
B.

The 10% Threshold

Criticism has been raised that the hard-and-fast rule, which
requires a 10% limit on liabilities, could have unintended
consequences.110 A large financial company, for example, could break
into two companies and one portion could acquire another financial
company.111 Although the two resulting companies will be separate
corporate entities after the break-up, they may still inherit some of the
systemic risk from their “former conglomerate.”112 In addition to this
break-and-merge possibility, there are further cases where a strict 10%
rule may not achieve its intended goal.
Suppose, for example, that there are two large financial
companies, Company A and Company B. Both companies are
considering an acquisition of a third firm, Company C. Let us assume
that A’s share of liabilities is 10% and both B and C have liability shares
of 5%. Under the 10% threshold rule, A cannot acquire C but B can. If
B is successful in its acquisition attempt, there will be two equal-sized
firms in the market: A (10%) and the merged firm of B and C (a combined
10%). Without the 10% rule, however, A may merge with C resulting in
two firms of unequal size: B (5%) and the merged firm of A and C (a
combined 15%). It seems unclear, however, which market configuration
would be more desirable for the stability of the financial system.
These examples seem to suggest that perhaps regulators should
choose a sliding-scale approach over a rigid rule. But this is not
necessarily the best approach because the strict rule, requiring the 10%
threshold, can provide a valuable strategic advantage.113 When a
109. Id.
110. VIRAL V. ACHARYA ET AL., REGULATING WALL STREET: THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND
THE NEW ARCHITECTURE OF GLOBAL FINANCE

197 (2010).

111. Id. at 210 n.4.
112. Id.
113. Vives, supra note 3, at 38 n.43 (noting the interpretation of the Federal Deposit

Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) to reduce regulator discretion).
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regulator becomes vulnerable to the industry’s demands, it may help the
regulator if it gives up its discretion and follows a rigid rule instead.114
This is an example of using a “commitment device,” which has been
studied extensively in economics and political science.115 A classic
example is Odysseus tying himself to the mast before hearing the Sirens’s
song.116 As the following discussion shows, however, section 622 lacks
such a commitment value because it contains exceptions that restore the
regulator’s discretionary power.117
V. PURPOSE-DEFEATING EXCEPTIONS
Section 622 has three exceptions.118 The de minimis exception,
which allows an acquisition that does not increase liabilities by more than
$2 billion, does not seem particularly harmful. The other two exceptions
from the 10% limit—the failing bank exception and the FDIC assisted
acquisition—create serious loopholes that defeat the purpose of the
legislation.119 The Brown-Kaufman Amendment and the SAFE Banking
Act were notable—although unsuccessful—attempts to correct this
problem.
A.

The Problem with the Exceptions

One of the exceptions provides that the Fed may allow a merger
that would exceed the concentration limit if the merger involves an
acquisition for which the FDIC is providing assistance.120 What is
troubling about this exception is that such assistance is likely to occur

114. Id.
115. Id. at 41–43.
116. HOMER, THE ODYSSEY 214 (Robert Fitzgerald trans., Farrar, Straus and Giroux

1998).
117. See infra Part V.
118. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) §
622(c), 12 U.S.C. § 1852(c) (2012).
119. See Elizabeth F. Brown, The New Laws and Regulations for Financial
Conglomerates: Will They Better Manage the Risks Than the Previous Ones? 60 AM. U.L.
REV. 1339, 1411 (2011) (arguing that these exceptions undermine the purpose of the rule by
allowing too-big-to-fail banks to become even bigger); Roberta S. Karmel, An Orderly
Liquidation Authority Is Not the Solution to Too-Big-To-Fail, BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM.
L. 1, 42 (2011) (arguing that failing firm exception “could make the concentration limit
superfluous”).
120. Dodd-Frank § 622, 12 U.S.C. § 1852(c)(2).
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during a financial crisis, which is exactly when the Fed needs its
commitment power most. Given that the FDIC is bound by the law to
choose the least costly way to resolve failed institutions,121 the logic
behind the exception seems straightforward—if a merger that exceeds the
liability concentration limit is the most efficient way to resolve a failed
institution, the Fed should be able to allow it despite the concentration
limit. But pursuing ex post efficiency in this manner creates ex ante
inefficiency—moral hazard of insured institutions—the very problem
that Dodd-Frank is trying to address.
The exception for a failing bank122 is equally, if not more,
problematic. Apparently, it is inspired by the “failing firm defense” of
antitrust law, which under certain conditions permits an otherwise
anticompetitive acquisition.123 Both permit an acquisition of a failing
institution by another financially healthy institution even when such an
acquisition would not be allowed under normal circumstances. However,
these two situations differ in two significant ways.
First, the failing firm defense in antitrust law is subject to strict
restrictions, while the failing bank exception is not. The failing firm
defense is “rarely invoked” and, when it is invoked, it is “rarely
successful” because a strict legal standard is applied.124 There is no such
standard in section 622 that limits the scope of the failing bank
exception.125
Second, the justification for the failing firm defense does not
apply to the failing bank exception. The rationale for the failing firm
defense is that, compared with the alternative scenario in which the
121. Federal Deposit Insurance Act § 13(c)(4), 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4) (2012).
122. Dodd-Frank § 622, 12 U.S.C. § 1852(c)(1).
123. For failing firm defense and its efficiency justification, see generally John E. Kwoka,

Jr. & Frederick R. Warren-Boulton, Efficiencies, Failing Firms, and Alternatives to Merger:
A Policy Synthesis, 31 ANTITRUST BULL. 431 (1986).
124. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV. COMPETITION COMMITTEE, THE FAILING
FIRM DEFENCE 175 (2010), http://www.oecd.org/competition/mergers/45810821.pdf. More
specifically, the failing firm defense requires that:
(1) the allegedly failing firm would be unable to meet its
financial obligations in the near future; (2) it would not be able
to reorganize successfully under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Act; and (3) it has made unsuccessful good-faith efforts to elicit
reasonable alternative offers that would keep its tangible and
intangible assets in the relevant market and pose a less severe
danger to competition than does the proposed merger.
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 32 (2010).
125. Dodd-Frank § 622, 12 U.S.C. § 1852.
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failing firm exits the market, permitting the acquisition tends to increase
industry output and hence lower prices.126 Acquisition of a failing firm,
therefore, normally does not raise an antitrust concern. Allowing an
acquisition of a failing bank, however, increases the liabilities of the
acquiring bank and hence makes it more vulnerable to the risk of
default.127 In other words, such an acquisition tends to exacerbate, not
mitigate, the TBTF concern.
B.

Failed Attempts: Brown-Kaufman Amendment and the Safe
Banking Act

The problems with section 622 did not go unnoticed. Before the
passage of Dodd-Frank, a group of senators proposed an amendment—
known as the Brown-Kaufman Amendment—in order to address some of
the issues pointed out by critics including the concentration limit. 128 On
May 6, 2010, the Senate rejected the Brown-Kaufman Amendment in a
sixty-one to thirty-three vote.129
The Brown-Kaufman Amendment provided a concentration limit
similar to the one in section 622.130 More specifically, it prohibited a
BHC from holding non-deposit liabilities that exceed 2% of the annual
GDP of the U.S.131 Additionally, the Brown-Kaufman Amendment
prohibited nonbank financial companies supervised by the Fed from
holding non-deposit liabilities that exceed 3% of the U.S. GDP. 132 If a
violation occurred, the Fed would have been required to implement a
corrective action plan by ordering a sale or transfer of assets, terminating
one or more activities, or imposing conditions on the activities.133

126. Kwoka & Warren-Boulton, supra note 123, at 445.
127. An implicit assumption here is that the acquiring bank will maintain roughly the

same leverage ratio before and after the acquisition. Although unlikely, if the acquisition is
substantially financed by newly raised capital, the acquiring bank could become less
vulnerable to the risk of default after the acquisition.
128. 156 CONG. REC. S2765 (daily ed. Apr. 28, 2010).
129. 156 CONG. REC. S3352 (daily ed. May 6, 2010).
130. S. Amend. 3733, 111th Cong. (2010).
131. Id. § 14(b)(1). For 2014, the amount would be $347 billion. U.S. DEP’T OF
COMMERCE, BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, http://www.bea.gov/national/index.htm#gdp (last
visited Feb. 8, 2016).
132. S. Amend. 3733 § 14(b)(1). For 2014, the amount would be $520 billion. U.S. DEP’T
OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, http://www.bea.gov/national/index.htm#gdp
(last visited Feb. 8, 2016).
133. S. Amend. 3733 § 14(c).
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The Brown-Kaufman Amendment also had clauses concerning
the leverage ratios and the nationwide deposit cap.134 It required that, for
bank holding companies and nonbank financial companies supervised by
the Fed, Tier 1 capital must be at least 6% of both average consolidated
total assets and all outstanding balance sheet liabilities. 135 In addition,
the proposed amendment strictly prohibited a BHC from holding more
than 10% of the total deposits of all insured depository institutions.136
In 2012, the amendment bill was modified and reintroduced
under the title Safe, Accountable, Fair, and Efficient Banking Act
(“SAFE Banking Act”).137 Regarding the concentration limit, the SAFE
Banking Act amended section 622 by prohibiting a financial company
from holding more than 10% of the total consolidated liabilities of all
financial companies.138 The SAFE Banking Act thus essentially removed
the exceptions from section 622. Any financial company exceeding the
limit would be forced to sell or otherwise transfer liabilities to unaffiliated
firms.139
The concentration limit under the Brown-Kaufman Amendment
did not have the “organic growth” exception allowed under both section
622 and the Riegle-Neal Act.140 Had the Brown-Kaufman Amendment
been adopted, therefore, “three [banks]—Bank of America, Wells Fargo,
and JPMorgan Chase . . . would have had to shed” their deposits in excess
of the 10% cap.141 Such a measure may have seemed too drastic to most
members of Congress.
Another notable aspect of the Brown-Kaufman Amendment and
the SAFE Banking Act was that, in addition to the deposit and liability
cap, they both aimed to limit the non-deposit liabilities of financial
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id. §§ 13(b), 620(f)(1).
Id. § 13(b).
Id. § 620(f)(1).
Safe, Accountable, Fair, and Efficient Banking Act of 2012, H.R. 5714, 112th Cong.

(2012).
138. Id. § 3(b).
139. Id. § 3(c). Another difference with the Brown-Kaufman Amendment was that the
leverage limit was changed so that bank holding companies with assets of $50 billion or
greater and the nonbank financial companies supervised by the Fed are required to hold at
least 10% of their total consolidated assets in tangible common equity. Id. § 5A. “Tangible
common equity” is defined as qualifying common stockholders’ equity plus retained earnings.
Id. § 2(a)(4).
140. COUNCIL STUDY, supra note 48, at 9.
141. David M. Herszenhorn & Sewell Chan, Financial Debate Renews Scrutiny on
Banks’ Size, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2010) at A1.
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institutions in terms of the percentage of GDP.142 It has been argued that
such an approach, “a real cap on bank size,” could have an advantage of
limiting not only the systemic risk but also the political power of large
banks.143 Interestingly, the same approach has been advocated for by a
Governor of the Fed, but on different grounds—it is simpler and has the
advantage of limiting the size of financial firms to the economy’s
“capacity to absorb losses.”144 This suggests that the debate over the
Brown-Kaufman Amendment and the SAFE Banking Act may not be
over yet.
VI. CONCLUSION
Section 622 of Dodd-Frank limits the size of large financial
institutions.145 It requires that the total liabilities of a financial company
after a merger may not exceed 10% of the total liabilities of all financial
companies in the U.S.146 Section 622 thus extends the existing
nationwide deposit cap by expanding its coverage to non-deposit
liabilities and non-bank financial institutions.147
Yet section 622, as it stands now, does not seem to serve its
purpose.
The bright-line rule—the characterizing feature that
distinguishes section 622 from other similar Dodd-Frank provisions—is
eaten up by the exceptions that give discretionary power back to the Fed.
Attempts have been made to correct the problem, although they have not
been successful so far.
If section 622 does not do much, what should be done about it?
The answer might be “nothing.” This will be the case, for example, if
one believes that financial mega mergers are not worrisome or the Fed
will not allow such mergers when proposed. Given that history has
proven otherwise, such a belief seems rather unreasonable.
Assuming that a change is necessary, what should be the direction
142. S. Amend. 3733, 111th Cong. § 14(b)(1) (2010); H.R. 5714 § 5A(b)(1)(A).
143. E.g., SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER
AND THE NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN

219 (2010).

144. Daniel K. Tarullo, Governor, Fed. Reserve Bd., Fin. Stability Reg., Speech at the

Distinguished Jurist Lecture, Univ. of Penn. L. Sch., 23 (Oct. 10, 2012),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/tarullo20121010a.htm.
145. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) §
622, 12 U.S.C. § 1852 (2012).
146. Id.
147. Id.
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of such a change? A good start would be taking out the exceptions in
section 622. A more comprehensive reform—such as changing the
measure of size or the coverage of the institutions—would require more
elaborate analysis. For this purpose, the Brown-Kaufman Amendment
and the Safe Banking Act seem to be a natural starting point.
S. KENNETH LEE

